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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
GLE·NDORA JACKSON, 
Plaintiff ana Appellant, 
vs. 
ARTHUR LARRON COI~STON and 
MARY A. ZUPO, doing business as 
POSTURE-FORM STU·D;IO, 




STATEMENT 0 1F FACTS 
The defendants, ArthlJr Larron Colston and Mary A. 
Zupo, were partners operating a business in the Mcintyre 
Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, under the name and style 
of Posture-Form Studio (Tr. 18). They held the~ijselves out 
as being able to assist in tissue rejuvenation, weight reduc-
tion, muscle and nerve relaxation, and further, that they 
could aid and improve the movement and flexibility of joints 
(Tr. 18). In such business for the purposes indicated they 
used what is known as an infra-red lamp and also a "de-
polray" lamp. They charged $17.50 for thirteen treatments. 
The first treatment was called a courtesy treatment; it was 
to demonstrate the kind of treatments given (T'r. 19-207). 
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Plaintiff went to the defendants because she was over 
weight and further because she was having trouble with her 
left ankle, which had been sprained some eight years before. 
On March 18, 1946, plaintiff began the regular course 
of treatments and received them two or three times a week 
until almost the 15th of April, 1946. She was first placed 
on what was called table No. 1 (Tr. 210) for a period of 20 
minutes. This table had some kind of mechanical action 
which massaged certain portions of the plaintiff's body. No 
heat or lamps were applied to plaintiff's body on this table, 
but she was given inhalations of oxygen. She was then 
placed on table N·o. 2. another mechanical contraption which 
massaged other portions of plaintiff'·s body. In connection 
with this table, there was used what was called a "de-polray" 
lamp (T'r. 211). 
The "de-polray" lamp was a fake according to the testi-
mony of "Doctor" Plumb, a witness for the defendantS, 
which generated a very small amount of heat and simply 
produced a magnet inside of the lamp that could pick up 
small nails, hairpins, and things of that sort, and the small 
magnetic force which emanated from the lamp could not 
possibly have any effect on the human body (T'r. 2:58). 
This lamp was placed about an inch from plaintiff's 
left ankle and was left on for a period of 10 minutes (Tr. 
212). After being on table No.2 for a period of 10 minutes 
she was placed on table No. 3, which was another mechanical 
table and which shook the entire body of the plaintiff. On-
this table another lamp was used which was placed approxi-
mately from 24 to 30 inches from plaintiff's ankle (Tr. 215). 
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This third table was called "Sea Biscuit," the motion re-
sembling that of the famous running horse of that name. 
This lamp was larger than the one used in co~nection with 
table No.2. It was called an infra-red lamp and was applied 
for almost ten minutes. 
At about the fifth treatment the plaintiff noticed that 
her ankle was becoming inflamed, or as she described it, 
"a flaming area." (P. 7 4.) The ankle became purplish red 
and was very painful and she had to go back and forth in a 
cab. She spoke to the attendant about it who told her, "You 
always get worse before you get better." (P. 75.) She prog-
ressively got worse and in April, the heel broke open and 
also the toes, the ankle had swollen to about twice the nor-
mal size and was very much inflamed and dark looking. 
They continued to use the lamp which just produced a warm 
comfortable feeling. In the last treatment received there 
was a feeling of heat (P. 75). 
She showed Mrs. Zupo the ankle and that defendant 
stated that she would massage it, but plaintiff refused as 
she was worried about its condition. By the time for the 
eleventh treatment, about April 15·, 1946, her ankle had 
become so painful and inflamed that she had great difficulty 
in walking. Towards the latter part of May, 19'46, she called 
a doctor (Tr. 85), who instructed her how to care for the 
ankle. Other doctors later were also consulted concerning 
the condition of plaintiff's ankle. 
The following testimony of Doctor Ray T. Woolsey and 
Doctor Alexander might be helpful to the court. 
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Dr. Ray T·. Woolsey, one of the physicians who treated 
plaintiff, testified that the plaintiff talked with him first 
over the phone and then came to his office; that she was suf ... 
fering from a discharging sore near the ankle (Tr. 105); 
that he examined it and from the examination concluded that 
she had been burned; that it would require a lot' of treat-
ment; that he recommended that she see some surgeon for 
an operation as he was confining his work to obstetrics and 
gynecology. 'He recommended that she keep wet dressings 
on it and wash, the burned area with some mild antiseptic; 
that there had been a destruction of tissue around the sore 
spot (Tr. 106) ; that it did not have the appearance of being 
a flame burn; that there was nothing to indicate that it was 
a flame burn. The Doctor then testified : 
"Q. Doctor, are you familiar with burns from 
electricity, from applying electric treatment, and 
burns of that kind? 
A. Not specifically. I know they produce a 
definite-more or less a charring, not charring-the 
tissues become white~ the circulation is destroyed 
due to the action of the electric heat on the tissues. 
Q. What would you say, in your opinion, whe .. 
ther the electric heat could cause such a burn as you 
saw? 
A. I think so, sir. 
Q. And if caused by electric heat, it is usually 
quite a deep burn, deep into the tissues? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did this have that appearance deep in the 
tissues? 
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A. Yes, a deep hole in the tissues where it 
sloughed out, and this hole was a quarter to half of 
an inch deep then. 
Q. And burns of that kind, what would you say 
as to whether or not in your opinion they are much 
more difficult to heal than an ordinary burn from 
flame? 
A. There is no way of telling how deep it will 
go, and when the tissues are destroyed from electric 
heat of that kind, the tissues usually slough out, and 
the only thing to do is wait until its sloughs out, until 
you see 'vhat it is, and let the scar tissue fill the hole." 
Dr. Alexander who also treated the plaintiff for the 
burns testified that he first saw her in June of 1947. He 
testified in part as follows : 
"A. And on the left ankle there was a large 
ulcerated sore, oh, I would say almost the size of _a 
quarter, with two small other ulcerated areas in close 
association with it, and around the whole ulceration 
there was a reddened area, it was tender and swollen, 
and very painful to the touch. And this area, in addi-
tion to the area of the sores, was about as large as a 
dollar. 
There seemed to be-there was considerable. 
tenderness along the side of Mrs. Jackson's leg ex-
tending almost as far as the knee; she was unable to 
bear any weight on it without having considerable 
pain.'' 
* * * I 
"I inquired very carefully into the history of 
Mrs. Jackson, she told me she had a series of treat-
ments, electric heat treatments of some sort applied 
to that ankle and I, after eliminating other possibili-
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ties which I didn't find responsible for it, came to 
the conclusion the only thing that could cause it was 
the electric treatments she had been subjected to. 
Q. And would electric treatments cause such a 
condition? 
A. Y'ies, if the electric treatment is too strong, 
too continuous, or if it is applied too frequently 
when the tissue is not of good nutrition." 
·The defendants so far as the record shows had no train-
ing in medicine or the treatment of injuries or sickness. The 
testimony of Mary Zupo is very illustrative. She had grad-
uated from the South High school in 'Salt Lake City, and 
following her graduation had taken a business course at 
Henager Business College ; she then became an office secre-
tary in an accounting office where she took shorthand and 
typewriting. From there she went into the "Posture-Form 
Studio" to give the treatments in question. She had never 
had any training in medicine. The defendant, c·olston, who 
was not present in court, instructed her how to give treat-
ments and how to use the tables. She became his partner in 
19·44. She ~ad made a self-study of dietetics, anatomy, and 
physiology; that for a reducing diet they used a printed 
pamphlet (Tr. 244) . 
We are not interested in this appeal as to the extent 
of plaintiff's injuries. The medical testimony, however, as 
set forth above is very corroborative of plaintiff's evidence 
that she suffered from electrical burns. Plaintiff continued 
to receive medical treatment for her burns from May, 1947, 
practically to the time of trial. That the lamp on table No. 
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3 could burn can scarcely be denied. On one occasion, the 
lamp caused the leather on the table to emit an odor because 
of the heat (Tr. 80). 
In addition to the plaintiff's testimony and the medical 
testimony, 've have the admission by the defendant Zupo 
that the defendants had burned plaintiff. During the month 
of ... ;.ugust, 1946, plaintiff went to the defendants' place of 
business and there talked to the defendant Zupo concerning 
her condition and showed her ankle to her. At that time the 
defendant Zupo stated that they, the defendants, had burned 
her (Tr. 89). It is undisputed that the lamps were under 
the exclusive care of the defendants. None of the patrons 
were allowed to operate the lamps, and the patrons were 
not even allowed to get off a table without the aid and 
assistance of defendi).nts (Tr. 73, 74, 216, 29·5-298). The 
defendant Zupo, of course, denied that she told plaintiff that 
she had been burned. The defendants also produced an 
electrical engineer, a so called expert, who testified that he 
believed that the lamps used could not burn anyone. 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the defendants 
each made a motion for a directed verdict of, "No cause of 
action," (Tr. 333, 334). The court granted the motion 
stating, "I am of the opinion that the jury could. do nothing 
more than speculate as to the cause of the injuries that 
the plaintiff suffered as far as this evidence is concerned." 
(Tr. 3-34, 335.) 
Within the time allQwed by law, the plaintiff duly filed a 
motion for a new trial which was by the court denied. 
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A statement of the errors upon which plaintiff relies 
for a reversal of the judgment of the court below: 
1. The Court erred in directing a verdict in favor of 
the defendants and against the plaintiff. 
2. The Court erred in overruling and denying the 
plaintiff's motion for a new triaL 
ARGUMENT 
Both of the above referred to specifications of error for 
the purpose of this argument should be considered together. 
The sole and only question we are concerned with here is 
whether or not there was sufficient evidence adduced on 
the part of the plaintiff to take the case to the jury. We 
submit that in view of the plaintiff's statement that the 
defendants admitted that they had burned her and that the 
doctors who were caring for her were treating her for an 
electricaJ burn, and that there was no evidence of the plain-
tiff ever having been burned, except at the defendants' 
place of business, that the jury should have been allowed to 
consider the matter and determine where the truth Ia~ 
\ 
'The testimony is undisputed that the lamps used by the 
defendants were under their exclusive care and control and 
that they were the only ones who operated or attempted to 
operate them, and that at no time were the lamps operated 
by the plaintiff; that on each occasion, it was the defendants 
who placed the lamps upon and over plaintiff's ankles. In 
view of the undisputed testimony that the lamps were under 
the exclusive care of the defendants and that a burn would 
-
not ordinarily result from the use of the lamps if they were 
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operated properly, and which in the course of ordinary events 
would not burn the plaintiff, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
applies. 
That the ~octrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to 
the case at bar is indicated by the following cases applied 
to similar situations. 
In Shauvin v. Krupin, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 322, 40 P. (2d) 
904, the plaintiff while getting a permanent wave at de-
fendant's beauty shop received a scalp burn. She brought an 
action against the defendants alleging in general the acts 
performed by the defendants in th~ course of their work. The 
acts constituted the entire operation undertaken by defend-
ants in which plaintiff might have received her injuries and 
they were all charged to have been done in a negligent man-
ner. In affirming the judgment the court said: 
"It is a case in which the application of the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine is imminently just and proper. 
The devices used in the process were under the ex-
clusive control of the defendants. The injury was 
one which in the natural course of things would not 
have occurred, had the defendants used due care, 
and plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover, un-
less the defendant offered a satisfactory explanation 
to overcome the presumptive evidence of their negli-
gence." · 
In Higgins v. Byrnes, 274 Ala. App. 440, plaintiff went 
to the defendant's beauty parlor to get a permanent wave. 
She was burned by the apparatus. The court said that there 
was no evidence that the apparatus used was defective and 
that it followed that the injury to plaintiff was caused by the 
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failure of the defendant's operator to use the necessary pre-
cautions to protect plaintiff's scalp, and this failure was 
negligence. 
See also 
Pearson v. Butts (Iowa) 276 N. W. 65; 
Davis v~ Graves, .250 Ky. 6.54, 63 S. W. (2d) 803; 
Swedin v. Friedman, 9 La. App. 44, 118 So. 787; 
Gavin v. Kluge, 275 Mass. 3'72, 17·6~ N. E. 193. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has also been held 
applicable in cases involving the use of X-ray machines and 
in givin~ treatments. In this connection, see : 
Also 
Waddell v. Woods, 158 Kans. 469; 148 P. (2d) 
1016, 152 A. L:. R. 629. 
Gray v. McLaughlin (Ark.) 179' S. W. (2d) 686; 
Ragin v. Zimmerman, 206 Cal. 72:3, 276 P. 107; 
Holcombe v. Magee, 21'7 Ill. App. 272. 
The opinion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could 
be invoked in an action where a patient sought recovery for 
burns allegedly received when being treated by his physician 
with an X-ray machine was expressed in Johnson v. Mar-
shall, 241 Ill. App. 80. There the court said: 
"The X-ray was under the exclusive control. of 
the defendant, and there is evidence that the injury 
to the plaintiff is not a necessary result of a treat-
ment by an X-ray machine. While the evidence is not 
as conclusive as it might be, yet, we are of the opin-
ion that the testimony is to the effect that the result 
that followed the use of the X-ray is not a necessary 
nor the known and usual result which follows an 
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application of the character made by the use thereof 
upon the plaintiff. More precisely the doctrine 'res 
ipsa loquitur' asserts that whenever a thing which 
produced an injury is shown to have been under the 
control and management· of the defendant, and the 
occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of events 
does not happen if due care has been exercised, the 
fact of injury itself will be deemed to afford suffi-
cient evidence to support a recovery in the absence of 
any explanation to support a recovery in the absence 
of any explanation of the defendant tending to show 
that the injury was not due to his want of care." 
In the case at bar, it is admitted and undisputed that the 
lamps which were used in treating the plaintiff were under 
the exclusive control of the defendants. Plaintiff testified 
that the defendant Zupo upon being shown plaintiff's ankle 
stated that they had burned her and that they were sorry 
and wanted to know if she would come back to their place 
of business and see what they could do for her. The de-
fendants, of course, denied that they ever made such a 
statement to the plaintiff. Whether or not such a statement 
was made was for the jury to decide. 'The trial court was 
of the opinion that the jury could do ~othing more than 
speculate as to the cause of plaintiff's injuries. How the 
court could reach such a conclusion is difficult to see, in 
view of plaintiff's testimony, the medical evidence, and the 
admission of defendant Zupo, and the fact that the doctrine 
of res ipsa applies in this case. 
It is, of course, an elementary proposition Qf law that 
liability for an injury cannot be predicated upon conjecture 
or speculation. It must be based upon actual proof, both 
of negligence and of a causal relation between that negli-
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gence and the injury sustained. The cause of an accident 
may be said to be speculative when from a consideration of 
all the facts it is as likely that it happened from one cause 
as another. 
See Frescoln v. Puget Sound Traction Co., 90 Wash. 59, 
155 P. 395. 
There is no evidence whatsoever in the case at bar to 
indicate that the plaintiff's injury was from any other cause 
than the treatment given her by defendants. Where is there 
any evidence that plaintiff's injury was just as likely due 
to sorne other cause than it was the treatment given her by 
defendants? There is none. There was nothing for the jury 
to speculate about; it was whether they would believe the 
testirnony offered on behalf of plaintiff or that of defend ... 
ants. 
A case which in principle is on all fours with the case 
at bar is the case of Zimmerman v. Auerbach, 81 Utah 5·54, 
17 P. (.2d) 251. This was an action by plaintiff for injuries 
to her caused by the negligence of defendant~s employee in 
giving a permanent wave. Plaintiff testified in substance 
that before giving the permanent wave treatment her hair 
was examined by the operator who asked whether she had 
ever used anything on her hair, to which she answered, 
"Yes, I have used some peroxide on the back." The operator 
stated that they would not take the responsibility of deter-
mining what sort of a permanent wave best suited her hair 
and called the defendant, who after examination said her 
hair would take any kind of wave that they had in the shop. 
The operator then proceeded to give her hair a "Duart 
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Wave'' and handed plaintiff a watch with instructions to 
advise the operator at the end of five minutes after the 
electric current was applied. After one or two minutes, 
plaintiff complained of pain and that her head was being 
burned, and the operator told her that she would have to 
stand a little heat. Plaintiff again complained of burning, 
but the operator did not turn off the electric current until 
the expiration of the five minutes. After the electrical appli-
ances were removed, the hair was discolored, streaked, 
sticky, brittle and came out when touched. In order to pre-
sent a respectable appearance plaintiff was compelled to 
have her hair cut and to wear a wig until it grew out again; 
that as a result of the treatment plaintiff's scalp was blis .. 
tered and she became sick and suffered physical pain and 
mental distress. 
The evidence showed that the injury was caused by the 
use of the wrong chemical solution and the application of 
heat for a longer time than appropriate for hair which had 
been treated with a bleach solution. The treatment given 
was that ordinarily given to natural hair. By the evidence 
the issue was narrowed to the question of whether plaintiff 
had told defendant that she had used peroxide in her hair. 
Defendant's testimony was to the effect that plaintiff was 
asked if she had used dyes, restoratives or tonics, and that 
she said that she had not, and that she was then given the 
treatment applicable to natural hair. This issue was sub-
mitted to the jury by appropriate instructions, There was 
a verdict and judgment fo:r plaintiff. 
It was the contention of the appellant that the injury 
to plaintiff's hair and scalp was as -likely to have occurred 
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from something other than the treatment given by defend-
ant, and thus the jury would have to speculate with respect 
to how the injury occurred. The court in considering this; 
concluded that it was for the jury to determine whether or 
not the defendant had been careless and negligent in the 
treatment of plaintiff and that it was not speculative. 
A reading of that case will indicate a fact situation very 
similar to the case at bar. 
An interesting Utah case which will throw much light 
on the question involved in this case is_ the case of Peterson 
v. Richards, 73 Utah 59~; 272 Pac. 2:29'. That was an action 
by plaintiff against defendant to recover damages for in-
juries sustained by plaintiff during the course of an opera-
tion being performed upon her by the defendant. The testi-
mony showed that defendant was performing an abdominal 
operation on plaintiff. After the operation and while plain-
tiff was coming out of the anesthetic, she complained of her 
hand. Upon examination of plaintiff's hand, it was found 
that the fingers had been smashed. Plaintiff's hand was in 
perfect condition before entering the operating room. It 
could have been smashed by the operating table or by the 
bed upon which plaintiff was placed after leaving the oper-
ating room and which was manipulated up and down while 
she was coming out of the anesthetic. 
It was the plaintiff's contention that after she left the 
hospital and consulted the defendant, that the defendant 
admited to her and to her husband that he had injured 
plaintiff's hand by crushing it in the crevices on the oper-
ating table. The defendant denied ever having made such 
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an admission and demonstrated in court that her hand could 
not possibly have been injured while on the operating table, 
but that it was more likely to have happened in the manipu-
lating of the hospital bed. The jury found for the plaintiff. 
The defendant contended that the only way the jury could 
find for the plaintfif was to speculate or conjecture as to 
the cause of the injury. The court stated, however, that 
the defendant did not by any direct or positive evidence 
show that plaintiff's hand was injured by manipulating or 
adjusting the bed, but sought such an inference to be de-
duced from the facts and circumstances proven by him and 
from manipulations of the bed before the jury. 
That is exactly the situation we have in the case .at bar. 
Here plaintiff testified that the defendant admitted that 
they had burned her. The defendants sought to prove by an 
expert that the lamp in question could not possibly burn 
anyone and thus, by inference, that plaintiff's injuries were 
from some other cause. In this respect the case at bar is on 
all fores with the above cited case. 
In Peterson v. Richards (supra), the court stated that 
admissions of matters of fact of a party are of such proba-
tive effect when adverse or disserving, and voluntarily made 
as to make a prima facie case to the extent of the subject 
matter of the admission, and to dispense with other proof 
of the fact so admitted and is sufficient to support a find-
ing of fact resting alone upon such extrajudicial admission-
of a party. 
It should be for the jury to det_ermine whether the de-
fendant made such an admission or not. 
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We respectfully submit that the court was clearly in 
error in directing a verdict against the plaintiff. So far as 
the evidence is concerned, plaintiff had never been burned, 
or received any other injury to her ankle, other than a break 
in it several years before. The only time that any heat or 
other treatment was given to plaintiff1s ankle which could 
possibly have burned the same and injured her was the 
treatment given her at defendant's place of business. 
'Tb say that the jury, if allowed to consider this case 
would have to speculate as to the cause of plaintiff's injury, 
is invading the province of the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WIDLA1RD HAN'SON, 
STE·WAR'T M. HANSON, 
Attorney$ for Appellant~ 
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